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THE DEATH OF DIVERSITY? AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
IN THE WORKPLACE AFTER PARENTS INVOLVED
Katherine M. Planer∗
I.

INTRODUCTION

Soon after the Supreme Court of the United States handed
1
down its “bitterly divided” ruling in Parents Involved in Community
2
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, news outlets launched debates
about what the decision meant for the future of integration in public
3
schools and the legacy of Brown v. Board of Education. Less debated in
the mainstream media is the effect that Parents Involved will have in
the realm of employment law. While it may seem to be a tremendous
leap to equate a ruling about education to the entirely distinct field
of employment, a closer look at both jurisprudence and scholarly literature reveals that courts have often treated employers and educa4
tors with a similar level of deference. After the Court’s landmark de5
cision in Grutter v. Bollinger, scholars in the field of employment law
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1
Jess Bravin & Daniel Golden, Court Limits How Districts Integrate Schools—RaceBased Policy Ban Augurs Broad Changes; Clash Over Brown Case, WALL ST. J., June 29,
2007, at A1.
2
127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
3
See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Divided Court Limits Use of Race by School Districts, WASH.
POST, June 29, 2007, at A01; Bravin & Golden, supra note 1; Linda Greenhouse, Justices, Voting 5-4, Limit the Use of Race In Integration Plans, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2007, at
A1.
4
Rebecca Hanner White, Affirmative Action in the Workplace: The Significance of
Grutter?, 92 KY. L.J. 263, 270–71 (2003).
5
539 U.S. 306 (2004).
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6

published a multitude of works analyzing the probable effect of Grutter on affirmative-action programs in the workplace, both in the public sector, which is governed by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and in the private
7
8
sector, which is governed by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
While Parents Involved did not change the meaning of Grutter per se, it
9
did explicitly limit the reach of Grutter’s holding to higher education.
Thus, Parents Involved potentially put in jeopardy the scholarly arguments and modes of legal interpretation that rested on Grutter’s
foundation. The question arises: how did Parents Involved change the
way scholars and courts must view workplace affirmative-action programs?
Both Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause prohibit racial
discrimination, but they are not interpreted to impose the same restrictions. Title VII has long been interpreted to allow employers to
engage in affirmative action not only to remedy their own past discrimination but also to open opportunities and to remedy racial im10
balances in their workforce. Equal protection has not afforded employers the same opportunities or, at least, has not done so as clearly
as Title VII. Thus, Title VII is often described as being “more permissive” than the Equal Protection Clause when it comes to allowing em11
ployers to consider race in their employment decisions.
Prior to Parents Involved, the distinctions between Title VII and
the Equal Protection Clause played out in the form of two arguments
6

See, e.g., Lorin J. Lapidus, Diversity’s Divergence: A Post-Grutter Examination of Racial Preferences in Public Employment, 28 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 199 (2006); Ronald Turner, Grutter, The Diversity Justification, and Workplace Affirmative Action, 43 BRANDEIS L.J.
199 (2005); White, supra note 4.
7
Employees can sue both private and public employers for violations of Title
VII. See White, supra note 4, at 265. Typically, however, employees bring suits against
public employers under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Stephen J. Shapiro, Section 1983 Claims to Redress Discrimination in Public Employment:
Are They Preempted by Title VII?, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 93, 99–103 (1985) (describing the
substantive differences between Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983—the vehicle for
bringing suit against the government for violation of constitutional rights, such as the
Fourteenth Amendment— and explaining why some claimants might prefer the constitutional route). Thus, this Comment will refer to Title VII actions as those against
“private” employers because those are the type of employers frequently sued under
the statute.
8
42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006).
9
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2753
(2007) (“The specific interest found compelling in Grutter was student body diversity
in the context of higher education.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
10
See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 203–07 (1979).
11
See, e.g., Eric A. Tilles, Casenote, Lessons from Bakke: The Effect of Grutter on Affirmative Action in Employment, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 451, 462–63 (2004).
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in favor of diversity as a valid justification for affirmative action. The
“parity” argument, which is the primary focus of this Comment, essentially claims that if diversity could be considered a compelling justification for workplace affirmative action in the public realm, especially after Grutter, then it should necessarily be considered a valid
12
reason under Title VII.
That argument was significantly undermined by the decision in Parents Involved, but it may still find some
support in Justice Kennedy’s controlling concurrence. On the other
hand, the “statutory” argument contends that the justification for diversity and affirmative action lies within the text and legislative history
13
of Title VII itself. While that argument receives significantly less attention, it may nonetheless be vitally important to the survival of diversity as a basis for affirmative action in employment because of both
the Parents Involved decision and the current makeup of the Court.
The subject of this Comment is academically significant not only
because of the freshness of Parents Involved, which has been a controversial decision that will produce a multitude of scholarly works, but
also because Parents Involved seemingly undermines the current state
of legal analysis in the realm of diversity and affirmative action in the
workplace. The “parity” theory in favor of diversity in the workplace
appears to hinge almost completely on Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, and even there its survival is debatable. As for the “statutory”
theory, the Court’s recent history of narrow statutory interpretation
makes the chances of success less likely, although the pro-business nature of the Court leaves some room for debate if employers could devise sufficient business justifications for diversity in the workplace.
Part II of this Comment discusses the history of Title VII jurisprudence to emphasize the greater deference historically granted to
employers under Title VII as opposed to the Equal Protection Clause.
Part II also analyzes the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
14
Third Circuit decision in Taxman v. Board of Education, a pre-Grutter
decision, which held that, despite the broader range of permissible
behavior sanctioned under Title VII’s “remedial” concept, Title VII
did not permit race-based employment decisions designed to pro15
mote diversity. Part III provides analysis of the Parents Involved decision and specifically focuses on the definition of “diversity” as a compelling interest and its future application to employment cases. Part
12

See id.
See White, supra note 4, at 275.
14
91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996).
15
Id. at 1558 (“Here, there is no congressional recognition of diversity as a Title
VII objective requiring accommodation.”).
13
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III also discusses the ways in which scholarly arguments about Grutter
and Title VII are no longer as persuasive after Parents Involved. Finally, Part III inquires whether diversity can ever be used to justify affirmative action in employment in a way that would not violate Title VII.
II. CONTEXT OF THE DEBATE
While both Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause prohibit
employment discrimination, they are not interpreted to impose the
same restrictions. Courts are generally less stringent when interpreting Title VII, particularly with regard to the only court-approved justification for affirmative action in the work place—remedying prior
16
discrimination.
Unlike its meaning under the Equal Protection
Clause, the “remedial justification” for affirmative action under Title
VII can extend beyond remedying prior discrimination at the specific
workplace in question to remedying a more general “discrepancy” of
the minority group in the workforce. Equal protection has not extended the meaning of “remedial” to such lengths or, at least, has not
done so as clearly.
A. An Overview of Title VII Jurisprudence
The history of the Supreme Court’s evaluation of affirmativeaction programs under Title VII is relatively brief. The Court de17
cided two cases, United Steelworkers of America v. Weber and Johnson v.
18
Transportation Agency, which form the substance of American affirmative-action jurisprudence within the private sector as governed by
Title VII. Johnson, the more recent of the two, was decided twenty
years ago, and though there have been significant developments in
19
other areas of race-conscious jurisprudence, the Court has yet to offer any additional specific guidance to lower courts evaluating the validity of workplace affirmative-action programs under Title VII. Furthermore, while Weber and Johnson offer some bright-line rules for
evaluating the statutory validity of workplace affirmative-action programs, the cases do not establish exclusive guidelines for what type of
16

See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 640 (1987) (holding an affirmative-action program statutorily valid even though it was intended not to remedy specific instances of past discrimination but instead to address a more general “conspicuous imbalance” of female and minority employees to white male employees in the
field).
17
443 U.S. 193 (1979).
18
480 U.S. 616 (1987).
19
See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306 (2003).
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rationale can be considered a “valid” reason for using a race20
conscious program in employment.
This lack of exclusivity and
guidance left room for scholars to argue over the future of this realm
of judicial interpretation, and scholars have done so by often using
Grutter as a signal of a more expansive approach on the part of the
21
courts.
1.

United Steelworkers of America v. Weber

Weber was significant because it was the first Supreme Court case
to address whether a workplace affirmative-action program was per22
missible under Title VII. The case involved a group of white males
who sued their union and employer for a violation of Title VII after
they were not granted admission into a workplace training program
for skilled craft workers even though they were technically more qual23
ified than the black workers selected.
The union and employer
adopted a plan that required fifty percent of the seats in the training
program to go to black workers until such time as the number of
black workers at the plant was proportional to the number of black
24
workers in the workforce. At issue was whether Title VII forbade
private employers and unions from enacting voluntary race-based
25
“bona fide” affirmative-action programs. The Court held that Title
VII did not forbid private employers and unions from adopting such
26
plans.
The plaintiffs challenged the program under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e27
2(a), which makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate
20

See White, supra note 4, at 274 (“Neither Weber nor Johnson categorically holds
that affirmative action must be remedially-based to be statutorily permissible.”).
21
See infra Part III.A (describing post-Grutter scholarship in this area).
22
Richard N. Appel, Alison L. Gray & Nilufer Loy, Affirmative Action in the
Workplace: Forty Years Later, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 549, 561 (2005).
23
Weber, 443 U.S. at 198–200.
24
Id. at 199.
25
Id. at 200.
26
Id. at 208.
27
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006). The statute states the following:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.
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against employees based on certain characteristics, such as race, sex,
28
and ethnicity.
The Court refused to construe Title VII literally,
which would have strictly prohibited even “beneficial” discrimination
(such as affirmative action), and instead interpreted Title VII in accordance with the Court’s understanding of legislative intent as expressed through the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act, with
29
specific focus on Title VII. The Court found that Congress intended
Title VII to remedy racial discrimination in the workplace and that
Congress intended to do so by encouraging private industry to take
its own action (or, at least, not discouraging the industry from taking
30
action).
To ensure that employers did not abuse the seemingly broad
discretion that the Court had given them to formulate affirmativeaction programs, the Court developed a two-pronged analysis that focuses on congressional intent and the interests of white employees,
which has subsequently been utilized by employers and courts in de31
termining the legality of affirmative-action plans under Title VII.
First, the Court noted that the plan at issue mirrored the intent of
Congress because its express purpose was to “break down old patterns
32
of racial segregation and hierarchy.” In this case, though the specific labor union had not admitted to racially discriminatory practices,
the Court recognized that black skilled craftworkers had “long been
33
excluded from craft unions” in the labor force. Thus, the Court
held the voluntary program was justified because it was designed “to
open employment opportunities for Negroes in occupations which
34
have been traditionally closed to them.”
Second, the Court held that the plan did not “unnecessarily
35
trammel” the interests of white employees. It neither required the
discharge of white workers and their replacement with new black
hires nor created an absolute bar to the advancement of white em36
ployees. Additionally, the Court opined that the plan was a “tempo37
rary measure” designed to end as soon as the percentage of black
Id.
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

Weber, 443 U.S. at 199–200.
Id. at 201–08.
Id. at 204–08.
Id. at 208.
Id.
Id. at 198.
Weber, 443 U.S. at 208 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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skilled craftworkers was roughly equal to the percentage of blacks in
38
the local labor force. Therefore, the Court concluded, private employers could enact voluntary affirmative-action plans if those plans
met the requirements that Weber set forth.
2.

Johnson v. Transportation Agency

In Johnson, the Court set forth additional guidelines enhancing
the Weber Court’s interpretation of permissible affirmative-action
39
measures.
The issue in Johnson was whether an affirmative-action
program that resulted in the hiring of a woman over an equally or
40
better-qualified man violated Title VII. The Court found that program to be legally valid. The Johnson Court established factors for determining both when it was appropriate for an employer to enact an
41
affirmative-action program and what type of program was acceptable.
In addition to the more “traditional” remedial justification expressed
by the employer in Weber, in which the employer used racial considerations to remedy its own specific instances of discrimination, the
Johnson Court held that it was appropriate for an employer to adopt
an affirmative-action program if the employer could identify a “conspicuous imbalance” in job categories traditionally segregated by race
42
and sex. Thus, the employer need not prove that there was any actual discrimination exhibited by the employer against blacks or wom43
en; the employer need merely prove that an imbalance existed.
Additionally, the Court concluded that once an employer can
justify the need for an affirmative-action plan, the plan needs to meet
certain requirements. Primarily, the employer must demonstrate that
the plan “represents a . . . flexible, case-by-case approach to effecting
a gradual improvement in the representation of minorities and wom44
en” in the workplace. Therefore, employment decisions cannot be
justified solely by reference to the imbalance but must rest on “a mul45
titude of practical, realistic factors.” This focus on an individualized
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

Id. at 208–09.
See Appel, Gray & Loy, supra note 22, at 562–63.
Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 619 (1987).
Johnson, 480 U.S. at 640–41.
Id. at 640.
Id. at 630.
Id. at 642.
Id. at 640–41. Those factors include
commit[ment] . . . to annual adjustment of goals so as to provide a reasonable guide for actual hiring and promotion decisions. [It] earmarks no positions for anyone; sex is but one of several factors that may
be taken into account in evaluating qualified applicants for a position .
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plan that considers race or gender as just one of many factors may
seem familiar because it is similar to the type of race-conscious college admissions plan advocated by Justice Powell in his Regents of Uni46
versity of California v. Bakke opinion. In fact, the Johnson Court cited
Bakke with approval in that regard, stating that “[t]he Plan [at issue]
thus resembles the ‘Harvard Plan’ approvingly noted by Justice Powell in Regents of University of California v. Bakke, which considers race
47
along with other criteria in determining admission to the college.”
Thus, although the courts apply different standards for affirmative-action challenges under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and those brought under Title VII, some overlap
exists between the rationale used by courts to satisfy strict scrutiny in
educational affirmative-action cases and the grounds advocated by
the Johnson Court as satisfying Title VII affirmative-action considera48
tions.
But the corresponding ideas between constitutional strict
scrutiny and statutory analysis under Title VII relate only to the
means. Neither the Weber Court nor the Johnson Court purported to
adopt Justice Powell’s suggested compelling end of diversity and instead restricted the permissible justification for Title VII affirmative
action to remedial purposes, albeit the more “expansive” interpretation of “remedial” set forth in Johnson, in which an employer could
49
remedy a “conspicuous imbalance.” Significantly, however, neither
decision established the remedial justification as the exclusive rationale for employers seeking to use affirmative-action programs in the
50
workplace. Additionally, the Johnson majority suggests that any kind
of affirmative action that would be permissible for the government
. . . [Further], the Agency has no intention of establishing a work force
whose permanent composition is dictated by rigid numerical standards.
Id. at 641.
46
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 316–19 (1978).
47
Johnson, 480 U.S. at 638.
48
In Bakke, Justice Powell applied the following standard of strict scrutiny: “[I]n
order to justify the use of a suspect classification, a State must show that its purpose
or interest is both constitutionally permissible and substantial, and that its use of the
classification is necessary . . . to the accomplishment of its purpose or the safeguarding of its interest.” Bakke, 438 U.S. at 305 (internal quotation marks omitted). While
Justice Powell found that the state’s interest in promoting diversity in higher education was “constitutionally permissible,” he found that the quota system was not necessary to accomplish that goal. Id. at 311–15. Instead, Justice Powell suggested individualized considerations of student backgrounds, such as those promulgated in the
Harvard Plan, as a constitutionally permissible means of satisfying the compelling
end of diversity. Id. at 315–17.
49
Johnson, 480 U.S. at 640.
50
White, supra note 4, at 274 (“Neither Weber nor Johnson categorically holds that
affirmative action must be remedially-based to be statutorily permissible.”).
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under Equal Protection would also be permissible for an employer
under Title VII and, thus, indicated that a compelling interest for the
51
The
sake of strict scrutiny should also satisfy a Title VII inquiry.
Court’s statement plays a vital role in the future analysis of the topic.
B. Taxman: Tightening the Reins
Using Johnson’s broader meaning of “remedial” as a starting
point, some employers established affirmative-action programs designed to further initiatives well beyond the traditional remedial context. Specifically, some employers engaged in race-based employ52
ment decisions designed to promote diversity, which, prior to
Grutter, some lower courts concluded that Title VII did not permit.
The most significant example of this was a decision by the U.S. Court
53
of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Taxman v. Board of Education.
While no lower court decided a Title VII case in a manner contrary to
Taxman after the Grutter decision, legal theorists argued that Grutter
strengthened at least one of the primary arguments for permitting di54
versity as a justification for racial considerations in the workplace.
After Parents Involved, those theories may have lost their foundation.
Nevertheless, the second theory—that diversity as a permissible justification for affirmative action may be justified by Title VII itself—still
remains. Thus, Taxman is significant because it clearly lays out the
two arguments for allowing diversity to justify workplace affirmative
action under Title VII. Additionally, Taxman’s importance is bolstered by the fact that current Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito was
one of the Third Circuit judges in the majority.
Sharon Taxman was a white schoolteacher working for the Pisca55
taway Board of Education. Deborah Williams was a black schoolteacher with the same level of seniority, ability, and qualifications as
56
Taxman. When the Board needed to lay off one teacher, it decided
to use its affirmative-action policy as a “tiebreaker” between the two
57
equally qualified candidates, and the Board retained Williams be51

Johnson, 480 U.S. at 628 n.6 (“[T]he statutory prohibition [in Title VII] with
which that employer must contend was not intended to extend as far as that of the
Constitution.”).
52
See infra text accompanying notes 62–66.
53
91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc).
54
See infra notes 92–102 and accompanying text.
55
Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1551.
56
Id.
57
The policy was used “to provide equal educational opportunity for students
and equal employment opportunity for employees and prospective employees, and
to make a concentrated effort to attract . . . minority personnel for all positions so
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cause she was the only black teacher in the school’s Business Depart58
ment. Taxman filed suit against the Board under Title VII, alleging
59
unlawful discrimination. Because the Board admitted that it used
the affirmative-action program in rendering the employment decision, the only issue in the case was whether the program was valid
60
under Title VII.
The court began its analysis by noting the “two primary goals”
that Title VII was designed to further: ending discrimination so as to
guarantee equal opportunities for employment and remedying the
effects of past segregation and underrepresentation of certain minor61
ity groups in the workplace. The court derived the statute’s purpose
from its legislative history and the congressional debates surrounding
62
its enactment. Thus, the court concluded, “unless an affirmative action plan has a remedial purpose, it cannot be said to mirror the
purposes of the statute, and, therefore, cannot satisfy the first prong
63
of the Weber test.” The Board’s affirmative-action plan explicitly contained no remedial purpose and instead was designed to ensure that
64
the staff was “culturally diverse.” The court found that the Board’s
policy therefore failed to meet the Weber standard, and as a result, the
Board violated the terms of Title VII when it invoked the program to
65
fire Taxman. The court performed a strict statutory interpretation
of Title VII, and that assessment reflected a narrow reading of the statute and its legislative history. This focus on the language of Title VII
was significant because while the issue of whether the statute itself
permits diversity as a rationale for affirmative action in the workplace
has been the subject of little focus and debate both in the courts and
that their qualifications c[ould] be evaluated along with other candidates.” Id. at
1550 (internal quotation marks omitted). The policy applied to “every aspect of employment including . . . layoffs.” Id. Further, the
policy did not have any remedial purpose; it was not adopted with the
intention of remedying the results of any prior discrimination or identified underrepresentation of minorities within the Piscataway Public
School System. At all relevant times, Black teachers were neither underrepresented nor underutilized in the Piscataway School District
work force.
Id. at 1550–51 (internal quotation marks omitted).
58
Id. at 1551–52.
59
Id. at 1552.
60
Id. at 1556. For an unknown reason, Taxman did not assert an Equal Protection claim. Id. at 1552 n.5.
61
Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1557.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 1550–52.
65
Id. at 1558.

PLANER

(Final Edit)

2009]

1/13/2010 5:23 PM

COMMENT

1343

in academia, it may play a huge role in the future of diversity in
workplace affirmative-action programs after Parents Involved.
Also significant was the court’s rejection of the Board’s attempt
to use Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection case law to justify diversity as a purpose that mirrors the intent of Title VII such that it
66
would comprise a valid basis for an affirmative-action program. The
court’s analysis is important because it addressed a “faulty premise”
upon which the Board’s argument was based and that many employment scholars invoked after Grutter to draw a connection between
67
Equal Protection and Title VII. This “faulty premise” is as follows:
since the Supreme Court noted in Johnson that “‘the statutory prohibition [in Title VII] with which an employer must contend was not
intended to extend as far as that of the Constitution[,]’[] . . . a purpose which survives constitutional strict scrutiny necessarily passes
68
muster under Title VII’s permissible purpose test.”
The Third Circuit had two problems with that argument. First,
the Third Circuit noted that the Supreme Court had not held that a
69
purpose that satisfies strict scrutiny must necessarily satisfy Title VII.
The court viewed the language from Johnson quoted by the Board not
as a holding but simply as the majority’s response to Justice Scalia’s
dissent arguing that Title VII is in fact more restrictive than the Con70
stitution. Second, the court rejected the Board’s argument that di71
versity was a compelling interest that satisfied strict scrutiny. It dismissed the Board’s reliance on Bakke, finding that “Bakke’s factual
and legal setting, as well as the diversity that universities aspire to in
their student bodies, are . . . different from the facts, relevant law and
72
the racial diversity purpose involved in this case . . . .”
Upon examining the court’s second ground for rejecting the
Board’s argument, the rationale behind much of the post-Grutter
scholarship arguing for equating diversity to a valid purpose for Title
VII affirmative-action programs becomes evident. Grutter meant that,
at last, a clear majority of the Court was validating diversity as a com73
pelling interest that survived strict scrutiny. Scholars argued that
66

Id. at 1559.
See, e.g., White, supra note 4.
68
Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1559.
69
Id. at 1560.
70
Id. at 1560–61.
71
Id. at 1560.
72
Id. at 1562.
73
The Court’s decision validated an even broader concept of diversity than the
First Amendment academic-freedom diversity suggested by Justice Powell in Bakke.
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311–12 (1978) (describing academic67
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Grutter expanded upon what the majority in Johnson suggested—that
Title VII necessarily reaches at least as far as the Constitution, if not
further—and, with Grutter as good law, scholars contended that diversity as the primary purpose behind a private affirmative-action pro74
gram might be legal under Title VII. The Court, however, has not
reconciled Title VII and the Constitution, and Parents Involved likely
stripped away the arguments for diversity in the workplace almost as
quickly as they had arisen from Grutter.
III. DIVERSITY’S EVOLUTION
A. Grutter and Title VII: Shaping Legal Analysis
After the Court’s decision in Grutter, scholars in the field of employment law jumped at the chance to analyze the Court’s first opinion in more than twenty years about racial-preference programs in
75
education. What made Grutter more significant than other recent
racial-preference cases related to employment was its compelling76
interest rationale. For the first time, a majority of the Court held
that higher-education institutions had a compelling interest in
77
achieving diversity on campus. That was significant because the decision signaled a break from the “remedial paradigm” of raceconscious selection programs and permitted institutions to consider
freedom diversity). That is why Grutter was extraordinarily significant for the purposes of analyzing diversity in the workplace.
74
See, e.g., Tilles, supra note 11, at 463–64.
75
The last case to discuss racial-preference programs in higher education was Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
76
Past employment discrimination decisions did not seem to support the idea
that diversity could ever constitute a compelling governmental interest such that it
could survive strict scrutiny; in fact, the decisions barely embraced the constitutionality of affirmative action for remedial purposes. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that “government can
never have a ‘compelling interest’ in discriminating on the basis of race in order to
‘make up’ for past racial discrimination in the opposite direction”); Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505 (1989) (holding that the city “failed to demonstrate a
compelling interest in apportioning public contracting opportunities on the basis of
race”). In Adarand, however, Justice O’Connor did not completely rule out the government’s ability to demonstrate that it had a compelling interest for instituting diversity-based affirmative-action programs. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237 (opining that
strict scrutiny analysis is not “‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact’ . . . [and] [w]hen racebased action is necessary to further a compelling interest, such action is within constitutional constraints if it satisfies the ‘narrow tailoring’ test”). Whether that suggestion expressed the opinion of the Court is unclear because that idea might be
deemed inconsistent with Justice Scalia’s concurrence and, thus, only the view of the
plurality.
77
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003).
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race even if there was no evidence of past discrimination at the par78
ticular institution. To that end, the Court noted that colleges could
use individualized considerations of race and gender, among other
characteristics, as a narrowly tailored method of achieving that diver79
sity. The Grutter decision was especially important in the realm of
employment law because the Court’s rationale for finding diversity as
a compelling interest was based not only upon Justice Powell’s origi80
nal First Amendment justification in Bakke but also on sociological
81
factors that included the American workforce.
A logical connection exists between affirmative action in higher
education and affirmative action in the public workplace because
both types of programs are subject to judicial strict scrutiny under
82
Equal Protection analysis; thus, scholars discussed at length the po83
tential impact of Grutter on public-employment affirmative action.
Additionally, the parties arguing in favor of diversity in Grutter, as well
as Justice O’Connor’s opinion, mentioned the need for diversity in
the workplace, which made the topic ripe for academic discussion af84
ter the Grutter decision. An examination of scholarly literature after
Grutter demonstrates that this argument was the principal one ad85
vanced by legal theorists.
While many sophisticated and well78

Cynthia Estlund, Taking Grutter to Work, 7 GREEN BAG 2d 215, 216–17 (2004).
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334.
80
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311–12 (A diverse student body is clearly “a constitutionally
permissible goal for an institution of higher education. Academic freedom . . . long
has been viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment. The freedom of a
university to make its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its student body.”).
81
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (“These benefits [of diversity] are not theoretical but
real, as major American businesses have made clear that the skills needed in today’s
increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely
diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints.”); see also Tilles, supra note 11, at 458
(classifying the “second” group of interests the Court identified in Grutter as “those
interests that contribute to society by educating a diverse population”). Tilles further
explains that
[t]he interests identified in the second group, however, go well beyond
Bakke’s rationale[, as they] . . . are concerned with meeting societal
goals, not accommodating academic freedom . . . . The preeminent
concern in this second group is the benefit received by society by providing an education to a diverse population.
Tilles, supra note 11, at 459 (emphasis added).
82
See generally Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (applying
strict scrutiny to Equal Protection inquiries in public employment); Bakke, 438 U.S. at
361–62 (applying strict scrutiny to Equal Protection inquiries in higher education).
83
See, e.g., Lapidus, supra note 6; Turner, supra note 6; White, supra note 4.
84
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330–33 (2003).
85
See, e.g., Lapidus, supra note 6; Turner, supra note 6; White, supra note 4.
79
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respected employment-law academics hypothesized about the impact
that Grutter would have on both public- and private-employment af86
firmative-action programs, the few decisions relating to the topic did
87
not quite match most scholars’ expectations. Additionally, even if
those scholars correctly interpreted the state of legal affairs, Parents
Involved seems to undermine those legal arguments by distinguishing
Grutter and narrowing the scope of diversity as a justification for af88
firmative action in the public-education setting.
Perhaps the most important distinction to keep in mind when
analyzing the education decisions through the lens of employment
law is the difference in judicial interpretation between public employment challenged under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and private employment challenged under Title
VII. The former cases are analyzed using strict scrutiny whereas the
89
latter use the Weber test. While all scholars addressed this distinction
in their post-Grutter affirmative-action analyses, some chose to equate
the two to make the analysis more succinct or to suggest a solution to
90
the inherent inconsistencies between the two doctrines.
Other
scholars argued that it was precisely the difference between the Equal
Protection Clause and Title VII that meant Grutter would necessarily
91
impact Title VII if it impacted public employment. The latter line of
arguments comprises this Part’s focus. Essentially, scholars maintained that if diversity was considered a compelling interest for enacting race-conscious programs in public employment, diversity should

86

See generally Lapidus, supra note 6, at 200 (analyzing the Grutter decision’s potential impact on the diversity rationale for affirmative action in public employment);
Turner, supra note 6, at 200 (discussing the prospect of employers “develop[ing] diversity-based justifications for voluntary affirmative action in their workplaces” after
the Court’s decision in Grutter); White, supra note 4, at 263 (discussing the extent to
which Grutter might “affect a public or private employer’s ability to voluntarily adopt
an affirmative action plan in order to diversify its workforce”).
87
See Lomack v. City of Newark, 463 F.3d 303, 309 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding no
compelling interest in promoting the “educational benefits” of diversity in a firehouse through a purely race-based reassignment program). But see Petit v. City of
Chicago, 352 F.3d 1111 (7th Cir. 2003) (relying very heavily on Grutter to find a compelling interest in diversity that justified the police department’s use of racial classifications through an affirmative-action program).
88
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2754
(2007).
89
See supra notes 28–39 and accompanying text.
90
See, e.g., Jared M. Mellott, Note, The Diversity Rationale for Affirmative Action in
Employment After Grutter: The Case for Containment, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1091
(2006).
91
Tilles, supra note 11, at 463.
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be a permissible rationale for private employers. Thus, similar to
Taxman, the analysis was twofold: first, whether, after Grutter, courts
would find that diversity was a compelling interest in employment;
second, if diversity satisfied the Constitution, it necessarily meant that
diversity could justify affirmative action under Title VII.
The issue of whether Title VII permitted, in private employment,
workplace affirmative-action programs that would be permitted in the
93
public sector under constitutional analysis was still debatable, but
many scholars argued that Grutter lent substance to the argument that
diversity would be viewed as a compelling interest in the public sec94
tor. That, in turn, made the argument that Title VII should include
a diversity rationale more compelling. Some scholars argued that the
underpinnings of the Constitution and Title VII were inherently the
95
same and thus should be interpreted accordingly. Specifically, one
scholar noted that because Title VII and the Fourteenth Amendment
“share a fundamental antidiscrimination and integrationist policy,”
the interests in diversity by corporate employers mentioned in the
Grutter decision “remain the same when the legal analysis shifts from
96
constitutional to statutory law.” Additionally, because “judicial deference to their decision-making is something educators and employers
97
have in common,” the Court’s deference to institutions of higher
education with regard to assessments of the need for and benefits of
98
diversity may apply in the workplace.
Still other legal theorists suggested that, although the constitutional and statutory interpretations were not identical, they should be
interpreted the same way to resolve the “conflict” between Title VII
and Equal Protection jurisprudence that would arise if diversity were
held to be compelling in public employment but not the private sec99
tor.
Building on Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Johnson, in
which she noted that the analysis under the two claims was essentially

92

See, e.g., White, supra note 4, at 274.
Compare White, supra note 4, at 274 (“Johnson could be read to suggest [Title
VII] will be at least as accommodating as the Constitution.”) with Taxman v. Bd. of
Educ. of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547, 1560 (3d Cir. 1996) (“While the Supreme Court
may indeed at some future date hold that an affirmative action purpose that satisfies
the Constitution must necessarily satisfy Title VII, it has yet to do so.”).
94
See, e.g., White, supra note 4, at 270; Lapidus, supra note 6, at 250.
95
See, e.g., Turner, supra note 6, at 233.
96
Id.
97
White, supra note 4, at 271.
98
Turner, supra note 6, at 233.
99
Tilles, supra note 11, at 464.
93
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100

the same and should be treated as such by the judiciary, one scholar
noted that “[i]ncorporating the Grutter approach into the Title VII
analysis would permit a private employer to adopt an affirmativeaction plan if it was able to establish that the affirmative-action plan
yielded . . . similar societal good as the affirmative-action plan utilized
101
by the University of Michigan Law School.”
Other scholars asserted that, even if diversity was not considered
to be a compelling interest for affirmative action in public employment, it could still be considered a legal justification for affirmative
102
action in the private sector.
Because Johnson permitted employers
to institute affirmative-action programs for non-remedial purposes,
even if they had not actually discriminated but if instead there was a
“conspicuous imbalance” of certain minorities in the workforce, scholars noted that “employers ha[d] more freedom under Title VII to
engage in remedially-based affirmative action than the [C]onstitution
permits . . . . [A] private employer can engage in affirmative action
in situations where a public employer, constrained by the Constitu103
tion, cannot.”
That flexibility in the remedial realm, combined
with the language in Johnson indicating that Title VII was not in104
tended to be as limiting as the Constitution for employers, provided
support sufficient to make a reasonable argument that “the statute
105
will be at least as accommodating as the Constitution.”
Further,
some scholars argued that the Court’s refusal to limit affirmative action in the public realm under Equal Protection only to remedial
purposes “suggests it will follow a similar approach in interpreting
106
[Title VII].”
That was the state of legal analysis until the decision in Parents
Involved. While no court ruled on a Title VII diversity claim between
the time the Court decided Grutter and Parents Involved, a number of
courts decided cases challenging diversity as a compelling interest for
workplace affirmative action under the Equal Protection Clause, and
100

Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 649 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]he proper initial inquiry in evaluating the legality of an affirmative action
plan by a public employer under Title VII is no different from that required by the
Equal Protection Clause.”).
101
Tilles, supra note 11, at 464.
102
White, supra note 4, at 275.
103
Id. at 273.
104
Johnson, 480 U.S. at 628 n.6 (“[T]he statutory prohibition [in Title VII] with
which that employer must contend was not intended to extend as far as that of the
Constitution.”).
105
White, supra note 4, at 274.
106
Id. at 275.
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107

those courts reached mixed results. An analysis of Parents Involved
will demonstrate that those scholars’ arguments were largely undermined but that the statutory argument for using affirmative-action
programs to further diversity in the workplace still remains.
B. Parents Involved: A Case About Employment?
Much like Grutter, Parents Involved is clearly not a case about employment law; its explicit application is in the realm of education.
Just as Grutter did after it was decided in 2003, however, Parents Involved adds to the conversation on affirmative action, even in the private sector covered only by Title VII. The case restricts the reasoning
of Grutter, which had allowed scholars to hypothesize about the expansion of permissible affirmative-action justifications beyond the
remedial reasons to the concept of diversity.
In Parents Involved, the Court analyzed the constitutionality of
two voluntary race-based school-assignment plans under which students were classified by race and the school districts used race as a
deciding factor in some instances when determining what school a
108
student would attend. A majority of the Court held that the plans
109
But a majority of Juswere unconstitutional under strict scrutiny.
tices could not reach agreement as to the rationale behind this decision. The Court held that the compelling interest purported to be
110
achieved through the programs was neither remedial in nature nor
111
the diversity-in-higher-education rationale recognized in Grutter and
that the use of race was not necessary to accomplish the goals that the
112
school districts sought to achieve.
The disagreement among the
Justices was with regard to the most important issues when considering strict scrutiny: compelling interest and narrowly tailored means.
For the purposes of this analysis, this Comment focuses only on the
former consideration. Specifically, this Comment concentrates on
whether Parents Involved leaves room for diversity to qualify as a com107

See, e.g., Lomack v. City of Newark, 463 F.3d 303, 309 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding
that diversity is not compelling in the public employment context by using Grutter rationale and applying strict-scrutiny analysis under the Equal Protection Clause); Petit
v. City of Chicago, 352 F.3d 1111, 1114 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that diversity is
compelling under Grutter rationale but applying more of an operational-needs test
than a strict Grutter analysis).
108
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2746
(2007).
109
Id. at 2768.
110
Id. at 2752.
111
Id. at 2754.
112
Id. at 2753–54, 2760.
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pelling interest outside of the specific Grutter context of higher education.
The analysis of this consideration is further restricted by the lack
of discussion of the matter in the plurality opinion, which thus gives
no indication of how a majority opinion on this specific issue might
rule. The plurality, composed of Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Alito, Thomas, and Scalia, did not consider whether racial diversity in
schools was compelling because the Justices found that the actual end
113
that each school districts attempted to achieve was racial balancing.
The Justices in the plurality found that the school districts’ plans were
“tied to each district’s specific racial demographics, rather than to
any pedagogic concept of the level of diversity needed to obtain the
114
asserted educational benefits.”
The school districts used percentage ranges to determine whether the racial and ethnic goals in their
districts were satisfied by making sure that the percentage of white or
black enrollment in schools was within ten percentage points of the
115
average number of whites or blacks living in the community. Thus,
the plurality stated that “[i]n design and operation, the plans are di116
rected only to racial balance, pure and simple.”
The plurality firmly reiterated that racial balancing was an illegitimate objective that was not compelling for the purposes of strict117
scrutiny analysis.
The Justices reached that conclusion by examining the means by which the school districts sought to achieve their
118
purported ends of “diversity.”
The plurality found that “the racial
demographics in each district . . . drive the required ‘diversity’ numbers” and, thus, that the plans “are not tailored to achieving a degree
119
of diversity necessary to realize the asserted educational benefits.”
The plurality suggested that the plans are actually “tailored . . . to the
goal . . . of attaining a level of diversity within the schools that approx120
imates the district’s overall demographics.” Thus, the plurality did
not address whether diversity could be a compelling interest if a
school district actually strove to accomplish diversity rather than mere
racial balancing.

113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120

Id. at 2755.
Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2755.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2755–56.
Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2755–56.
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On the other hand, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, which is
121
most likely controlling, acknowledged that diversity is a compelling
122
interest for a school district to pursue. Justice Kennedy found the
plans at issue to be unconstitutional because of their means, not their
123
purported ends.
Justice Kennedy shared the plurality’s skepticism
that the districts’ supposed ends of diversity were the actual ends and
that the districts were not just racially balancing under the guise of
124
“diversity.”
Justice Kennedy, however, acknowledged that, in gen125
eral, diversity is a compelling interest for a school district to attain.
Justice Kennedy asserted that the plurality was “too dismissive” of the
government’s legitimate interest in “ensuring all people have equal
126
opportunity regardless of their race.”
He then suggested ways in
which school districts can “seek to reach Brown’s objective of equal
educational opportunity” using “race-conscious measures . . . in a
general way and without treating each student in different fashion
127
solely on the basis of a systematic, individual typing by race.”
But
while Justice Kennedy was willing to acknowledge that diversity can be
a compelling interest in certain situations, he was careful to note that
racial classification should only be used to achieve this, or any other
128
compelling interest, as a last resort. Justice Kennedy did not elaborate on why diversity might be considered compelling in the school
context, but he granted the school districts a certain level of defe129
rence in accepting the fact that diversity has “educational benefits”.
He focused more on the means by which a school may achieve this
130
goal. Significantly, he did not address the “social benefits” aspect of
diversity to which Justice O’Connor devoted so much of her opinion
131
in Grutter.
121

See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a fragmented
Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of
five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those
Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds . . . .’” (quoting
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976))).
122
Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2789 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
123
Id. at 2790–91.
124
Id. at 2789–91.
125
Id. at 2789.
126
Id. at 2791.
127
Id. at 2791–92.
128
Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
129
Id. at 2797.
130
Id. (“What the government is not permitted to do . . . is to classify every student
on the basis of race and to assign each of them to schools based on that classification.”).
131
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330–33 (2003).
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Although Justice Kennedy’s concurrence preserves the ability of
public entities, at least in the field of education, to rely on diversity as
a compelling interest in certain situations, that notion is far more limited than it was in Grutter. That restraint is most clearly demonstrated by Justice Kennedy’s suggestions for narrowly tailored me132
thods that might survive strict scrutiny. Interestingly, he suggested
methods that he alleged would not trigger strict scrutiny—that is, race133
conscious but still race-neutral initiatives.
For example, he suggested “strategic site selection of new schools; drawing attendance
zones with general recognition of the demographics of the neighborhoods; allocating resources for special programs; [and] recruiting
134
students and faculty in a targeted fashion.” Thus, Justice Kennedy
suggested that the executive and legislative branches take a more
administrative approach towards achieving the goal of diversity in
135
schools.
The decision in Parents Involved indicates that the Court limited
the interpretation of diversity expressed in Grutter—diversity on campus to promote a diverse society, both at school and beyond—to
higher education. The majority specifically notes this point when it
states that “[t]he specific interest found compelling in Grutter was
136
student body diversity ‘in the context of higher education.’”
Whether a broader concept of diversity might still apply was not even
addressed by the plurality, and although Justice Kennedy confirmed
that diversity can be compelling in education outside of colleges and
universities, the methods that he suggested towards accomplishing
that end are even more restrictive than Grutter with regard to the level
of racial classification that can be considered. Although the decision
132

Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. (“These mechanisms are race conscious but do not lead to different treatment based on a classification that tells each student he or she is to be defined by
race, so it is unlikely any of them would demand strict scrutiny to be found permissible.”). Why those means would not trigger strict scrutiny under Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976), however, is far from clear. Davis stands for the proposition that
a selection system with an underlying purpose that is discriminatory cannot avoid
strict-scrutiny analysis merely because it uses race-neutral means. Id. at 241; Michelle
Adams, Isn’t It Ironic? The Central Paradox at the Heart of “Percentage Plans,” 62 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1729, 1760 (2001). Professor Adams also notes that “the Equal Protection Clause
is violated whenever state action is animated by a discriminatory purpose . . . . From
this perspective, the fact that the state has chosen to use ‘raceless’ means—[such as]
a percentage plan—to effectuate discriminatory ends will not insulate it from constitutional challenge.” Adams, supra, at 1732. Justice Kennedy did not discuss this possibility in his concurrence.
134
Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
135
Id.
136
Id. at 2753 (plurality opinion).
133
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in Parents Involved is far from straightforward in terms of making a
clear assertion about the future of diversity, both the plurality’s and
Justice Kennedy’s close, careful analysis of the school district’s actual
ends, as opposed to accepting the purported ends of diversity at face
value, limits diversity as a goal of affirmative-action programs. While
diversity is not forever restricted only to the realm of higher education, the message of the plurality, and of Justice Kennedy in particular, is that diversity cannot be a broad term applied to programs in
which racial considerations are factors.
The majority in Parents Involved was unabashed in its limitation
to higher education of Grutter’s concept of diversity. The Court suggested that certain “key limitations” in Grutter’s “holding—defining a
specific type of broad-based diversity and noting the unique context
of higher education”—should not be overlooked by lower courts
when they attempt to extend “Grutter to uphold race-based assign137
ments in elementary and secondary schools.”
Thus, the majority
held that Grutter did not govern the school-assignment plans at issue
and suggested that courts that applied the specific type of diversity referenced in Grutter to areas outside of the realm of higher education
138
were simply incorrect.
That narrowing of diversity as a compelling interest compromises the very foundation of many post-Grutter arguments for diversity in
139
employment. While Justice Powell’s reasoning in Bakke stressed diversity for the sake of academic freedom and educational benefit to
140
students, Justice O’Connor’s reasoning in Grutter emphasized diver141
sity for the sake of society as a whole, including the workplace. Parents Involved brought the focus of diversity back to an academic freedom rationale by emphasizing that even if diversity in higher
education is compelling for more reasons than just academic freedom, that type of diversity does not extend beyond higher educa142
tion. Now, it seems that any public employer arguing that diversity
was a compelling reason behind an affirmative-action program would

137

Id. at 2754.
Id.
139
See, e.g., Tilles, supra note 11, at 464.
140
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311–12 (1978).
141
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330–33 (2003).
142
Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2754 (2007) (“In upholding the admissions
plan in Grutter, though, this Court relied upon considerations unique to institutions
of higher education, noting that in light of ‘the expansive freedoms of speech and
thought associated with the university environment, universities occupy a special
niche in our constitutional tradition.’” (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329)).
138
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be much less likely to succeed, particularly if the employer uses Grutter’s sociological reasoning.
This in turn undermines the strongest argument that previously
existed for diversity under Title VII—the parity argument. If Title VII
and the Constitution are eventually interpreted to impose equivalent
requirements, then it is likely that under neither will diversity be a valid reason to impose an affirmative-action program. Thus, after Parents Involved, the last remaining argument for diversity as a legal justification for affirmative action in private employment must be that
diversity could stand if Title VII is interpreted to permit employers
more leeway to promote workplace diversity than the Constitution al143
lows. If Title VII is so interpreted, then diversity, as a legal justification, must be found within the statutory confines of Title VII itself.
C. Diversity in the Workplace?
Parents Involved raises two key questions with regard to diversity
and the workplace as governed by Title VII. First, is the argument for
“parity” between Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause still plausible? Second, can Title VII still be interpreted statutorily to permit
race-based employment decisions promoting diversity even if Equal
Protection does not allow such affirmative action? Those are precisely the two grounds that the Board argued in Taxman, and the Third
144
Circuit rejected them both. Since the bulk of scholarship and legal
analysis on this topic focuses on the former concern, this Comment
analyzes the plausibility of the parity argument after Parents Involved;
however, the arguments seem to overlap since the foundation for
both is the same—the Court’s interpretation of the statutory text.
If the Court interprets Title VII to grant private employers
slightly more freedom than public employers are given under the
Constitution, it is possible that diversity can be found to be a valid justification for an affirmative-action program. The Court has already
granted the private sector more leeway when it comes to affirmative145
action plans involving the remedial justification. The Court could
conceivably extend that leniency to include some modicum of diver143

This assumes that the Constitution would not permit diversity in the public
workplace at all after Parents Involved.
144
Taxman v. Bd. of Educ. of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547, 1558–59 (3d Cir. 1996).
145
White, supra note 4, at 275 (“[E]ven if diversity is not a compelling state interest . . . , might the statute permit an employer to make employment decisions aimed
at achieving racial diversity? [Johnson]’s view that the affirmative use of race under
the statute was more permissive . . . at least for remedial purposes, suggests the answer is yes.”).
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sity. Without Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Parents Involved, arguing that diversity had a fighting chance in any realm outside higher
education would be difficult. Justice Kennedy, however, left the door
open ever so slightly for employers to attempt to use diversity to justify racial considerations in the workplace. Early in his concurrence,
Justice Kennedy firmly stated that “[d]iversity, depending on its
meaning and definition, is a compelling educational goal a school
146
district may pursue.”
Thus, Justice Kennedy refused to extinguish
the possibility of diversity existing as a valid justification for affirmative action outside of the remedial- and higher-education contexts.
Any aspect of the workplace where this will be allowed, however,
seemingly will be governed only by Title VII and not by the Constitution.
As demonstrated by the Court’s analysis in Parents Involved, the
Court no longer seems willing to grant substantial deference to entities that claim “diversity” as their compelling interest without inquir147
ing into the substance of what they are actually achieving. While the
school districts claimed to be striving for diversity for “educational
benefits,” the plurality closely examined the methodology and de148
termined that, in fact, the schools performed racial balancing.
While the Court might be more deferential to employers in the private sector claiming “diversity” as their justification, given the Court’s
149
recent restrictive, literal trend in statutory interpretation, Parents
Involved indicates that the Court more likely will view such a rationale
with greater skepticism. This is signified by the unwillingness of both
the plurality and Justice Kennedy to take the school districts’ diversity
150
rationales at face value.
Employers attempting to use the diversity
rationale will have to develop persuasive arguments that demonstrate
that diversity mirrors the intent of Title VII and that the methods
employed to achieve that diversity do not “unnecessarily trammel”
151
the interests of non-minority workers.
After Grutter, a number of scholars suggested “goals that may be
served by accepting diversity as a justification for affirmative action in

146

Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2789 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 2758 (plurality opinion) (“Racial balancing is not transformed from ‘patently unconstitutional’ to a compelling state interest simply by relabeling it ‘racial
diversity.’”).
148
Id. at 2755.
149
White, supra note 4, at 274.
150
Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2755 (plurality opinion), 2793 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
151
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979).
147
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152

the private workplace.” One scholar argued that support for diversity in employment comes from the very place where diversity is still
153
allowed to stand—higher education.
Because Justice O’Connor’s
rationale for allowing diversity as a compelling interest involved consideration of American businesses and the military, one scholar argued that it seems counterintuitive to prohibit diversity initiatives in
the very areas that diversity in higher education is designed to bene154
fit—namely, the workforce. Similarly, another scholar noted that a
diversified workplace benefits society by “counteract[ing] stereotypes
and prejudices and cultivat[ing] broader and more inclusive trust
155
and mutual regard within the workforce.”
That argument may be
one of the strongest in favor of diversity, but employers using it
should proceed with caution.
Other scholars suggested justifications for diversity including increases in company productivity and a positive impact on general decision making because of the ability of a diverse workforce to better
156
serve an exceedingly more diverse clientele. In other words, “diver157
A company’s business interest,
sity is often good for business.”
however, would likely not be significant enough to justify the intentional discrimination that goes along with affirmative-action programs, which Title VII seems to literally prohibit yet also implicitly
158
159
permit, according to Weber, because of the statute’s purpose. The
challenge to employers is to devise a way to justify diversity that will
still further the intent of Title VII. Using the potential for greater
profit is probably not the best way to accomplish such a goal because,
as one scholar notes, “where profit is the or a predominant employer
motivation, courts may be more skeptical of and less willing to validate diversity-based affirmative action practices that disfavor male and
160
white employees.” The current Court, however, is one of the most
161
pro-business Courts in a long time and, thus, might be willing to defer to an employer’s claim that diversity is good for business.
152

Appel, Gray & Loy, supra note 22, at 571.
Turner, supra note 6, at 211.
154
Id. at 219.
155
Estlund, supra note 79, at 224.
156
Appel, Gray & Loy, supra note 22, at 571.
157
White, supra note 4, at 276.
158
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202 (1979).
159
White, supra note 4, at 278.
160
Turner, supra note 6, at 234.
161
You Need to Know: News: Briefs, TENN. B.J., Aug. 2007, at 5, 6 (“At the end of . . .
[the 2006–2007] U.S. Supreme Court term littered with heated 5-4 decisions, one bit
of clarity is shining through: the Roberts Court . . . [is] very conservative and very
153
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Even if an employer could devise a diversity-based justification
for an affirmative-action program that would survive the Weber test,
which will likely be viewed with an increasing level of skepticism by
the Court, the employer would have to apply the program in a way
that did not “unnecessarily trammel” the interests of non-minority
162
employees.
The best way that an employer could go about doing
this would be to devise initiatives similar to those suggested by Justice
Kennedy as a means for constitutionally attaining diversity in
163
schools. While a private employer obviously does not have to worry
about triggering strict scrutiny, which is Justice Kennedy’s primary
concern, the employer could use Justice Kennedy’s suggestions as a
guide by launching race-conscious but still race-neutral initiatives.
Large national corporations wishing to appeal to a broad consumer
base could meet their goal of diversity by targeting the areas in which
they interview potential employees or by building new offices and
stores in places where the demographics indicate that they will be
able to successfully achieve a diversified workforce. So long as the
employer focuses not on making evaluations based on race alone but
on meeting the needs of its customers while also being conscious of
the purposes of Title VII, those methods would probably not unnecessarily trammel the interest of non-minority workers. Thus, although Parents Involved narrowed and restricted legal arguments for
finding diversity to be a valid justification for workplace affirmative
action, conceivable options still exist through which the goal of diversity may be achieved in the employment setting.
IV. CONCLUSION
If it was true after Grutter that “employers considering and implementing diversity-based affirmative action plans . . . should proceed with caution and with full awareness that the law in this area is
164
not settled,” such a statement is certainly accurate after the Court’s
decision in Parents Involved. Diversity as a compelling interest in any
realm outside of higher education is uncertain, although Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence still leaves room for its existence. While Title

pro-business—more so than any Supreme Court in decades.”). But see Kenneth Starr,
The Roberts Court Gets Down to Business: The Business Cases, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 599, 602–03
(2007).
162
Weber, 443 U.S. at 208 (“[T]he plan does not unnecessarily trammel the interests of the white employees.”).
163
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2792
(2007).
164
Turner, supra note 6, at 237.
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VII has been, and likely will continue to be, interpreted to give employers more freedom and deference than they have under the Constitution, Parents Involved undermined the “parity” argument that was
so pervasive in the post-Grutter era with regard to affirmative action
and diversity under Title VII. A successful affirmative-action program
designed to promote diversity in the workplace would likely have to
both use race-neutral means to promote its ends and fully demonstrate that the actual ends of diversity sought to be achieved comport
with the purpose of Title VII.

